

PUBLIC VALUE
LA VALEUR PUBLIQUE

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The first part of this volume analyzes the political economy and the sociology of the public sector that are necessary to a full and relevant analysis of public economics.

The second part considers public goods with respect to properties of efficiency, distribution, and decentralized or public production. Basic properties are shown with the "triangle analysis" introduced here. The basis of the theory of the core for non-excludable public goods is laid out. Public goods produced by "coalitions" benefit other people. There is cooperation within coalitions and non-cooperative influences across them (Cournot-Nash or Stackelberg). There result an efficient allocation and distribution of the costs. Under some conditions, free riding is a losing strategy because other people adjust (non-strategically) in producing less of the good. Finally, the joint production of a public good by both voluntary contributions and an efficient tax financing is possible when individuals want to be good cooperators, praised or praiseworthy contributors to a public cause, or have opinions about comparative contributions (imitation, norm following, conforming, distinction, reciprocally contributing if the others contribute, envy, jealousy, or sentiments of inferiority or superiority).